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Summary 
This study focuses on the dynamic evolution of a small open economy specialized in 
tourism based on natural resources when tourist services are supplied to foreign tourists 
who are crowding-averse and give positive value to the environmental quality. We 
analyse the steady-state properties and run several policy exercises in two versions of 
our model: in the first, private agents’ income is spent entirely on consumption while, in 
the second, agents are allowed to invest part of their income in pollution abatement 
technology (PAT) which artificially increases the rate of regeneration of the 
environmental asset. A unique locally saddle point equilibrium is found in both versions 
and for both the market and the centralized solution. Our main findings are that: 1) a 
corrective income tax raises steady state utility in both versions but is capable of leading 
the economy in its first-best dynamic path only when agents cannot invest in the PAT; 
2) when the PAT is available to the government but not to agents, an income tax which 
finances abatement expenditures may increase steady state utility with respect to the 
market solution when the natural regeneration rate of the environment and the degree of 
crowding-aversion are both low enough; 3) when PAT is available, the market chooses 
to devote a higher fraction of income to abatement than the central planner but in both 
cases this fraction is positive only if the natural rate of regeneration is not too large; 4) 
when PAT is available an income pollution tax does not affect the dynamic path of the 
market economy. 
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Abstract
This study focuses on the dynamic evolution of a small open economy
specialized in tourism based on natural resources when tourist services
are supplied to foreign tourists who are crowding-averse and give positive
value to the environmental quality. We analyse the steady-state proper-
ties and run several policy exercises in two versions of our model: in the
￿rst, private agents￿income is spent entirely on consumption while, in
the second, agents are allowed to invest part of their income in pollution
abatement technology (PAT) which arti￿cially increases the rate of regen-
eration of the environmental asset. A unique locally saddle point equilib-
rium is found in both versions and for both the market and the centralized
solution. Our main ￿ndings are that: 1) a corrective income tax raises
steady state utility in both versions but is capable of leading the economy
in its ￿rst-best dynamic path only when agents cannot invest in the PAT;
2) when the PAT is available to the government but not to agents, an
income tax which ￿nances abatement expenditures may increase steady
state utility with respect to the market solution when the natural regen-
eration rate of the environment and the degree of crowding-aversion are
both low enough; 3) when PAT is available, the market chooses to devote
an higher fraction of income to abatement than the central planner but in
both cases this fraction is positive only if the natural rate of regeneration
is not too large; 4) when PAT is available an income pollution tax does
not a⁄ect the dynamic path of the market economy.
JEL CODES: :L83, O41, Q26, Q56.
KEYWORDS: Tourism Specialization, Sustainability, Environmental
Quality, Crowding, Pollution Abatement.
1 Introduction
A large number of less developed areas, both in the Mediterranean and in Eu-
rope, are facing the choice between investing their resources in tourism or in
￿I would like to thank Davide Fiaschi, Luca Deidda and Javier Lozano for useful insights
and suggestions. All errors are my own. This paper is part of the national interest re-
search project (PRIN) "Local Sustainable Development and Tourism" ￿nancially supported
by MIUR. Corrensponding author: Fabio Cerina, CRENoS, Viale Fra Ignazio, 78 - 09123 -
Cagliari (Italy) - e-mail: fcerina@unica.it
1more high-intensive technology sectors. A minimal requirement needed to make
a wise decision is to take into account the opportunity cost of the tourism option
in terms of the how the resulting economic performance will in￿ uence sustain-
ability. Despite this need, the information and the analytical tools available in
current economic literature are still unable to provide a satisfying assessment of
the performance of an economy specialized in tourism.
This de￿ciency becomes far more relevant once we consider a stylised fact
that recently appeared in some empirical analyses based on international cross-
country datasets. These studies show that, in recent years, small ￿tourism
countries￿grew at a signi￿cantly larger annual rate than the other small coun-
tries. In particular, during the last 20 years, the growth performance of ￿tourism
countries￿has been better than in OECD countries (Brau, Lanza and Pigliaru,
(2003)) and the income level of these small ￿tourism countries￿ is generally
above average. This positive relative performance poses interesting questions
concerning the economic mechanisms that lie behind it and the sustainability
of long-run economic performance associated to specializing in tourism. In par-
ticular, it is important to ascertain whether the positive economic performance
of such countries is due to a rapid and unsustainable exploitation of the natural
resources or if it is a more robust and sustainable phenomenon.
In this paper, our aim is not to deal with growth-related issues. Growth
can be introduced in our framework (for example by means of an exogenous
increase in the willingness to pay motivated by favorable terms of trade as
illustrated in Lanza and Pigliaru (1994) and Rey-Maquieira, Gomez and Lozano
(2004) or by international transmissions of growth from the tourism services
importer to the exporter as in Nowak and Sahli (2005)), but it would nonetheless
remain in the background and have no e⁄ect on the steady state level of the
environmental quality and of tourist ￿ ows. Our objective is to analyse the
dynamic properties, and the long-run relationship between the sustainability
of environmental resources, economic performance and welfare in an economy
which has already made the decision to specialize in tourism.
Although this problem seems particularly relevant, it appears to be rather
unexplored. There are a large number of studies and a large body of literature
dealing with the issue of the relationship between growth and environmental
resources (see Beltratti (1996) for a comprehensive survey of the literature) but
not many studies have dealt with the issue of the environmental consequences
of specializing in tourism. Yet, the problem is particularly interesting from the
theoretical point of view. Although the di¢ culties in ￿nding a clear and satis-
factory de￿nition for the concept of a "tourist good" are well known, the latter
seems to have a peculiarity not shared many other goods: the determinants
of its demand (and therefore of its equilibrium price, ceteris paribus) can be
negatively in￿ uenced by the demand itself. In other words, excessive demand
for tourism services provided by a given destination may lead to an impoverish-
ment of the quality of these services and, ultimately, to a worsening of economic
performance. This paper makes an attempt to fully understand the dynamics
and long-run consequences involved in this issue. We assume that the supply of
tourist services negatively a⁄ects the stock of environmental, natural and cul-
2tural resources of our destination and we identify tourism goods as a bundle of
services whose equilibrium price depends positively on the following two char-
acteristics: 1) the stock of environmental, natural and cultural resources and 2)
the number of tourists entries in the destination. While the presence of the ￿rst
factor in the hedonic price function of tourists is common to other related works
(Rey-Maquieira, Lozano and Gomez (2004); Candela and Cellini, (2004)), the
second factor is introduced in order to account for the fact that tourists might
not be merely interested in the quantity of the environmental resources, but
rather more in the quality of the tourist services supplied. And since the degree
of congestion of a tourist destination is an important determinant of the quality
of tourist services (Brau and Cao, 2005), tourists￿willingness to pay may well
decrease accordingly, other things being equal, when the number of tourists
entering a destination increases. In other words, we are dealing speci￿cally
with crowding-averse tourists1. Making the standard assumption that tourist
services are purchased only by foreign tourists, we analyse the steady-state prop-
erties of two versions of the same model. In the ￿rst version, private agents can
only use their tourist revenues to purchase a homogenous consumption good
from abroad. Within this framework we show that the long-run equilibrium is
a saddle point in both the market and the central planner solution, where the
former di⁄ers from the latter to the extent that agents￿take tourists￿willingness
to pay (WTP) as given, while the central planner does not. We ￿nd an explicit
solution for the steady state values of the relevant variables in each of the two
cases and, as expected, the stock of environmental resources and the number
of tourist entries are respectively higher and lower in the centralized solution.
Then we study the e⁄ect of a corrective tax policy, showing the existence of an
optimal tax rate capable of leading the economy towards its ￿rst-best dynamic
path, and we compare it with the e⁄ect of "pollution" income tax whose rev-
enues are invested by the government in pollution abatement technology. We
￿nd that for low values of the natural regeneration rate (i.e. the rate that gov-
erns the dynamics of environmental assets when no resources are invested in
pollution abatement technology), a pollution tax increases steady state utility
with respect to the market solution. For particularly low values of the natural
regeneration rate, a pollution tax can even do better than a ￿rst-best corrective
tax scheme. In the second version, we consider the hypothesis that agents save
part of their income in order to invest resources in pollution abatement tech-
nology which arti￿cially increases the rate of regeneration of an environmental
asset. We solve the market and central planner solution and show the locally
saddle point properties of the equilibrium in both cases. What we ￿nd is that
agents decide to save resources if and only if the marginal productivity of the
abatement e⁄ort is low enough. Moreover, we also ￿nd that the central planner
solution implies a lower fraction of resources devoted to abate pollution when
tourists are ￿ crowding-averse￿ . In our framework, this situation corresponds to
a low value of the natural regeneration rate. Finally, we apply the same policy
1The consequence of crowding-aversion has been investigated by Lanza and Pigliaru (1994)
but within a di⁄erent and static framework.
3exercise of the ￿rst version ￿nding that, in this case: 1) a corrective tax may
increase steady-state utility with respect to the market solution but cannot to-
tally correct the externality e⁄ect; 2) a pollution tax-scheme is not capable of
shifting the economy from the market dynamic path.
Apart from the literature dealing with the dynamic problem of exhaustible
resources, other related literature includes Rey-Maquieira, Lozano and Gomez
(2004) and (2005), where similar results are obtained with reference to the re-
lationship between market and centralized solution but where, unlike in the
present model, the stock of environmental resources is identi￿ed with the frac-
tion of land devoted to traditional activities and for which no abatement expen-
ditures are possible. On the contrary, Candela and Cellini (2004) consider the
dynamic decision of investing in pollution abatement technology but this deci-
sion is faced by a representative tourist ￿rm willing to maximize the discounted
sum of expected future pro￿ts. Neither of these studies though, have considered
crowding-adverse tourists.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the analytical frame-
work; section 3 solves the ￿rst version of the model and ￿nds the optimal correc-
tive tax rate; section 4 introduces pollution abatement technology but restricts
its availability to government initiative only; in section 5 the fraction of in-
come devoted to abatement expenditures becomes a choice variable for both
the agents and the central planner. Section 6 concludes.
2 The analytical framework
We consider an economy which supplies tourist services to foreign tourists. We
assume that each tourist, at any time t; buys one unit of tourism services so that
output at time t is measured in terms of tourist entries nt. As in Rey-Maquieira
Palmer, Lozano and Gomez (2004) and (2005), we assume the existence of
a hedonic price function where the equilibrium price is positively a⁄ected by
the quality of the tourism product. We assume the latter depends on two
characteristics: positively on the stock of cultural, natural and environmental
resources2 available at time t in our destination, Et and, negatively, on the total
number of tourist entries at time t; nt:
pt = p(Et;nt); (1)
pE ￿ 0;pn ￿ 0






2Even if with E we mean to capture not only merely environmental (landscapes, climate,
beaches) but also cultural (traditions, buildings, museums, activities) and "social" features,
we will refer to E as simply "environment" for the rest of the paper.
4where ￿ is a positive scaling parameter3. ￿ can be interpreted as a measure
of preference for the environmental quality, while ￿ is a measure of crowding
aversion. We assume that both ￿ and ￿ belong to the interval (0;1) ￿ R2 so
that pEE < 0; pnn < 0:









so that the willingness to pay can be viewed as an increasing and concave




and an increasing or decreasing con-
cave function of the number of tourist entries depending on whether ￿ ￿ ￿ is
positive or negative. Alternatively, if we interpret the inverse of per-capita en-
vironment ( n
E) as a measure of the crowding of the destination, we are then
assuming that tourists are crowding-averse. The term n
￿￿￿
t can be considered
as an additional preference (if ￿ > ￿) or aversion (if ￿ > ￿) over the number of
tourists in the destination4
The supply side of the economy is made up of a large number of competing
representative family ￿rms which we normalize to 1: Each of them chooses the
number of tourists nt to be hosted in a unit of time. We assume that the
international demand for tourism is in￿nite for the price level which corresponds
to the tourists￿willingness to pay and is nil for any other price level. So the
market clears all the time and the quantity of nt exchanged is totally determined
by the supply side. Tourism revenues correspond to the value of the economy￿ s
output and are given by





As for the demand side, we assume that the economy is populated by a
single in￿nitely-lived representative agent whose utility at time t depends pos-
itively on both consumption ct and the stock of environmental, cultural and
natural resources Et. Her lifetime utility is therefore given by an in￿nite sum




(lnct + ￿ lnEt)e￿￿tdt: (4)
So far, we have described the common structure of the two versions of the
model we will present. We ￿rst focus on the case where no pollution abatement
technology is available.
3Exogenous growth can be introduced by assuming that ￿ = ^ ￿egt where g > 0 represents
the constant growth rate of the willingness to pay due, for instance, to the continual increase
of the terms of trade. This assumption, as we will see, will only a⁄ect consumption which will
grow at rate g in steady state, but will not a⁄ect the steady state level of the environmental
stock and of the tourists entries which will remain constant.
4We can associate ￿ > ￿ to a preference for mass tourism and ￿ < ￿ to a preference for
"elite" or snobbish tourism.







not add much in terms of richness of results
53 The model without abatement expenditures
When no resources are devoted to defending the environment, tourism revenues
are entirely used to purchase homogeneous consumption goods produced abroad.
Since we are dealing with a small economy, we can assume that the price of the
consumption good is exogenously ￿xed and cannot be in￿ uenced by our econ-
omy. Without loss of generality we can assume that the price of consumption
is equal to 1: Therefore,





Following Becker (1982) and Cazzavillan and Musu (2001), the environmen-
tal resource stock is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the maximum tolerable
pollution stock ￿ P and the current pollution stock 0 ￿ Pt ￿ ￿ P
Et = ￿ P ￿ Pt
Di⁄erentiating with respect to time we obtain the law of evolution of the
environmental stock
_ Et = ￿ _ Pt (5)
We then assume that a constant proportion 0 < m0 < 1 of the pollution stock
is assimilated at each date t by the natural factors that govern the economy.
Moreover, we assume that the asset E decreases proportionally with the level of
tourist entries. When no resources can be devoted to abatement expenditures,
residents can in￿ uence the environmental asset only controlling tourist entries
nt:
_ Pt = ￿nt ￿ m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
(6)
where ￿ > 0.
Combining (5) and (6) we ￿nally get
_ Et = m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
which represents the motion equation for the state variable E:
3.1 The market solution
In the market solution, residents choose the number of tourists allowed to enter
and the level of consumption in order to maximize the lifetime utility function
taking the price p(E;n) as given. That is, they do not take into account that
their decisions over n can negatively in￿ uence foreigners￿willingness to pay ei-
ther directly (foreign tourists are crowding adverse) or indirectly (the number of
tourist arrivals negatively in￿ uence the stock of environmental resources which






[lnct + ￿ lnEt]e￿￿tdt (7)
s:t: : _ Et = m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt (8)
: ct = yt = ntp(Et;nt) (9)
: (ct;nt;Et) ￿ 0 (10)
6This is an optimal control problem with one state-variable Et and two control
variables (c and n): However, one control variable can be eliminated by means






= ￿ + m0 ￿
￿
￿tEt






￿ (￿ + m0) (11)
_ Et = m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt (12)
3.1.1 Steady state analysis
We are interested in an equilibrium which implies sustainability for the stock of
cultural, environmental and natural resources, i.e., _ E = 0: As we can easily see
from (12), _ E = 0 implies _ n = 0:
The two equilibrium manifold _ n = 0 and _ E = 0 are given by














Existence and uniqueness are easily proved by a quick inspection of the geo-
metrical properties of the two loci. They are two straight lines with positive and
negative inclination, respectively. Since n2 (E) has a positive vertical intercept,
they intersect only once in the positive orthant (E;n) plane and unique steady
state is then given by
Ess = ￿ Pm0
￿





￿ + m0 + m0￿
As for stability, we can state the following
Proposition 1 The equilibrium (Ess;nss) is locally a saddle point for the sys-
tem (11),(12)
Proof. See the appendix.
7All the steady state values of the relevant variables (the two control variables
c and n and the state variable E) can then be expressed as functions of the
parameter of the model.
As for the stock of cultural, environmental and natural resources, it￿ s clear
that: 1) as residents￿care for environmental quality increases, the steady state
value of E increases too (@Ess
@￿ > 0); 2) the stock of environmental resources
grows (proportionally) with the maximum tolerable level of pollution (@Ess
@ ￿ P > 0);
3) steady state value of E is positively in￿ uenced by the regeneration capacity
(@Ess
@m0 > 0); 4) if agents care less about the future, they end-up with a lower
steady state level of environment (@Ess
@￿ < 0).
It is worth noticing that if people do not care at all about the environment
(￿ = 0), the result will be the total exploitation of it (Essj￿=0 = 0). This
is because when ￿ = 0; since agents do not take into account the fact that
the stock of environment positively in￿ uences tourism revenues through the
foreigner￿ s willingness to pay, they will have no particular reason to desire a
positive value of E:






; 2) increase with the maximum level of tolerable pollution
￿@nss
@ ￿ P > 0
￿












@￿ > 0: We should stress that in the decentralized solution
the steady state values of n and E are not in￿ uenced by the parameters which
a⁄ect a foreigner￿ s WTP (￿ and ￿).
Steady state consumption, which in this model is equal to income, is given
by




m0 ￿ P (￿ + m0)





It is interesting to analyze the behavior of consumption with respect to envi-
ronmental care ￿: When ￿ = 0 (i.e. residents do not care about environment per
se), steady-state consumption is zero: since when ￿ = 0 the markets ￿nd it opti-
mal to totally exploit the environment, then tourism revenues (which positively
depend on the stock of environmental resources through the tourists￿WTP)
are also zero. As ￿ grows, the e⁄ect on the tourist revenues (and therefore on
consumption) is ambiguous: on the one hand, it allows for a higher steady state
level of the environmental asset and therefore brings a higher tourist revenues.
On the other, a higher ￿ means a lower steady state level of n which reduces














so there is an optimal level of ￿
￿ =
￿(￿+m0)
m0(1￿￿) such that steady state con-
8sumption is maximum in the decentralized solution6. If ￿ is low (￿ < ￿
￿); an
increase in the love for the environment (as a result of campaigns to sensitize
public awareness) gives rise to an increase in consumption too. This is because,
when E is very low, the marginal value that tourists will assign to the environ-
ment is very high so that their WTP increases signi￿cantly when E increases.
This is what happens when ￿ grows starting from very low values. As long
as this positive e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ is larger (in absolute term) than the
negative e⁄ect of ￿ on nss; there will be an increase in tourist expenditures
and therefore in consumption too. The relationship reverses when the increase
in ￿ leads to a value of E associated with a su¢ ciently low marginal utility
for tourists. Hence, we obtain a sort of golden rule level of ￿ with respect to
consumption.
3.2 The central planner solution
An hypothetical central planner would be aware of the fact that an increase in
the number of tourists has a negative e⁄ect on the foreign tourist￿ s willingness
to pay. As a consequence, the central planner would take this element into












t + ￿ lnEt
￿
e￿￿tdt
s:t: : _ Et = m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
: (nt;Et) ￿ 0






= ￿ + m0 ￿
￿ + ￿
￿tEt







￿ (￿ + m0) (15)
_ Et = m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt (16)
6The same level of ￿ represents instead a maximum when steady state consumption is














So that an increase in impatience ￿ may give rise to a higher consumption in the steady
state if the love for the environment is su¢ ciently high.
93.2.1 Steady state analysis
The _ nt
nt = 0 and _ Et = 0 loci are as follows
_ nt = 0 : n
cp
1 (E) =
(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿)E
(￿ + ￿)￿
(17)









It is clear that
n
cp
1 (E) < n1 (E); 8E > 0
Since the _ Et = 0 locus remains unchanged, sustainable development in the
central planner solution is guaranteed by a lower level of n. The two loci have
the same geometric behavior as n1 (E) and n2 (E); the steady state exists, is
unique and is given by
Ecp =
m0 ￿ P (￿ + ￿)




(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿) + m0 (￿ + ￿)
As for stability, we can state the following
Proposition 2 The equilibrium (Ecp;ncp) is locally a saddle point for the sys-
tem (16), (15).
Proof. In the appendix.
The signs of the derivatives with respect to ￿; ￿; m0 and ￿ do not change,













Let￿ s brie￿ y comment these results. The positive relationship between the
optimal steady-state solution of E and the elasticity of the WTP with respect
to price plainly evident: the more tourists care for the environment, the more
they are willing to pay for entering a country characterized by a high level
of environmental quality; as a consequence, the central planner will supply a
higher environmental quality in the steady state. But steady state environment
is also a positive function of the degree of crowding aversion ￿ : as ￿ grows, the
central planner tends to choose a lower number of n in steady state and this
choice will, ceteris paribus, provide a higher steady-state stock of environmental
resources. As for the equilibrium level of n; it is a negative function of both
￿ (since tourist entries have a negative e⁄ect on the environmental quality, the
central planner tends to choose a lower level of n as tourists￿concern for the
10environment increases) and ￿ (quite intuitively, the equilibrium level of n is a
negative function of the degree of crowding aversion).
As in the decentralized case, consumption behavior is less clear. Optimal





(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿) + m0 (￿ + ￿)
￿1￿￿+￿ ￿
(￿ + ￿)￿
(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿


















ss: Hence, a golden rule level of ￿ also exists in
the central planner solution but here consumption as a function of ￿ is maximum
for a lower level of ￿ with respect to the decentralized solution: since the planner
takes the change in tourists￿WTP into account, a lower degree of environmental
care is needed in order to reach the maximum consumption7.
So that the maximum level of consumption is higher in the central planner
case.
3.2.2 A comparison between the optimal and the decentralized so-
lution
It is easy to note that we will always have
Ecp > Ess; ncp < nss (19)
the di⁄erence lies in the fact that now the parameters ￿ and ￿ (respectively
the elasticity of the willingness to pay with respect to environmental quality and
tourist entries) are determinants of the steady state values of n and E; whereas
they were absent in the decentralized solution. This is particularly important
since ￿ and ￿ can be considered as policy instruments8. As a consequence, we
see that, unlike in the decentralized case, Ecp is strictly positive when residents
do not care about the environment (￿ = 0).9 This is because the central planner
7Is the golden rule level of consumption higher in the optimal or in the decentralized
solution? The question is not trivial since both the central planner and residents maximize
utility which depends on both consumption and the stock of environmental resources. In order





















8As already said, di⁄erent values of ￿ and ￿ can be associated to di⁄erent kind of tourism
demand. From this point of view, choosing for example a higher ￿ means identifying more
crowding-averse tourists as potential purchasers of the tourist services produced.
9Speci￿cally
Ecpj￿=0 = ￿ P
m0￿
(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿) + m0￿
> 0
11knows that the stock of environmental resources is important not only per se,
but also because environment positively a⁄ects tourists￿WTP and therefore it
increases tourism revenues and consumption.
Since consumption is a positive function of both n and E; it￿ s not so clear
whether steady state optimal consumption is higher or lower than it is in the
decentralized steady state level. We know that
ccp > css if and only if r(￿;m0;￿;￿;￿) > 1
















r(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ < 1
r0 (￿) < 0
so that there is one and only ￿ = ￿
r such that ccp > (<)css for any ￿ <
(>)￿
r
Hence, if the level of environmental care is low, consumption is higher in the
optimal solution. By contrast, if ￿ is su¢ ciently high (￿ > ￿
r); consumption is
higher in the market solution (see ￿g.110)
3.3 A corrective tax on residents￿income
In real economies, the central planner cannot impose the optimal consumption
path but can implement a ￿scal policy that encourages individuals to choose
values for the variables which are closer to the optimum with respect to the
market solution. In this setting a ￿rst-best policy scheme is possible and is
very simple. The central planner can tax tourism revenues and then simply
redistribute the tax gains with lump-sum transfers. The government￿ s budget
balance is then
￿ntp(Et;nt) = vt





(lnct + ￿ lnEt)e￿￿tdt
s:t: : ct = (1 ￿ ￿)ntp(Et;nt) + vt
s:t : _ E = m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
10Except when explicitly speci￿ed, all the graphs are drawn for the following parameter
values: ￿ = 0:05; ￿ P = 100;￿ = 0:35;￿ = 0:4;￿ = 1;￿ = 1;m0 = 0:2; ￿ = 0:25:
12The ￿rst-order condition and the euler equation are
￿t =
p(Et;nt)(1 ￿ ￿)







Once residents make their choice we can substitute for vt = ￿ntp(Et;nt)










￿ (￿ + m0)
_ Et = m0
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
In steady state, when _ E = _ n = 0; we have
_ n = 0 : n￿
1 (E) =
(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿)E
￿￿








The _ E = 0 manifold is not in￿ uenced by the tax (n￿
2 (E) = n
cp
2 (E) = nss
2 (E))
so that the aim of the CP is simply to ￿nd a tax rate such that the _ n = 0 man-
ifold associated to the corrective tax coincides with the _ n = 0 manifold in the
central planner solution
￿￿ : n￿
1 (E) = n
cp
1 (E)














the higher the degree of the externalities (￿ and ￿) and the lower the resi-
dents￿environmental care, the higher the tax must be.
4 The e⁄ect of abatement expenditures
From this section on, we will analyze the e⁄ect of the introduction of abate-
ment expenditures in the model. There are several ways to introduce pollution
abatement technology in this model. This kind of technology may be introduced
in order to 1) increase the level of maximum tolerable pollution ￿ P; 2) reduce
the marginal impact of the number of tourists on environmental resources; 3)
13increase the natural rate of regeneration capacity. Here we focus on the lat-





such that the dynamics of the
environmental asset is given by





￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
where dt stands for abatement expenditures and dt
yt represents the fraction
of national income devoted to abatement technology. We exclude the possi-
bility that the country can borrow resources from abroad, so that abatement
expenditures must be drawn from national income and so reduce consumption
possibilities. Then, it must be that dt ￿ yt and yt represent the upper-limit for














y > 0 8(d;y) > 0
The ￿rst assumption tells us that there is a positive natural regeneration ca-
pacity rate: when no resources are devoted to abating pollution, the proportion
of the pollution stock assimilated by natural factors (hereafter, the "natural"
regeneration rate) is given by m0; as in the previous section. The second as-
sumption tells us that when all the resources of the economy are devoted to
abatement expenditures, the whole current stock of pollution is assimilated.
The third assumption tells us that the regeneration rate is monotonically in-
creasing in d
y.
In order to ￿nd explicit solutions for the state and control variables, we assign










The motion equation for E then becomes
_ Et =
￿




￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
4.1 Public abatement expenditures
In this section the decision to improve the regeneration capacity is a prefogative
of the government, by means of an ex-post tax policy. That is, after agents￿
make their choice on n and c; the central planner taxes them, but instead of
redistributing tax revenues by means of lump-sum transfers, she will channel
funds from tax gains into pollution abatement technology. In other words, we
assume that only the government can have access to any abatement technology.
14If the central planner taxes income with a ￿d tax rate, the governments￿budget
constraint is then
￿dyt = dt
The motion equation then becomes
_ Et = [m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d]
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt




(lnct + ￿ lnEt)e￿tdt
ct = (1 ￿ ￿d)ntp(Et;nt)
_ Et = [m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d]
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
The Hamiltonian, the ￿rst-order and the euler conditions are the following
H = ln(1 ￿ ￿d)ntp(Et;nt) + ￿ lnEt + ￿
￿
(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)












+ m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d






￿ (￿ + m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
_ Et = (m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
The two equilibrium manifolds (￿g. 2) are given by
_ n = 0 : nd
1 (E) =
￿ + m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d
￿￿
E
_ E = 0 : nd
2 (E) =
(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
￿ ￿ P ￿ E
￿
￿
Again, the steady state exists, is unique and is locally a saddle11. Steady
state values are given by
Ed = ￿ P
￿ (m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
￿ + (1 + ￿)(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)




￿ + m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d
￿ + (1 + ￿)(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
￿
11The proof is analogous to the market solution without tax.





(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)[￿ + (1 + ￿)(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)]
> 0
So that a pollution tax would always improve the environmental quality with
respect to the market solution. Since when ￿d = 0, Ed = Ess; we see that
Ed ￿ Ess > 0 8￿ > 0
so that the steady state stock of environmental resources is certainly higher than
in the market solution without tax
By contrast, it is not clear whether the sign of Ed￿Ecp is positive or negative
given that (see ￿g. 3)
Ed > Ecp i⁄ ￿d >
m0
1 ￿ m0
(￿￿ + ￿)(￿ + m0)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ ￿ m0 (￿￿ + ￿)
This condition can be easily met for su¢ ciently low values of m0 : when
the natural rate of regeneration is very low (and so the marginal impact of
abatement technology is very high), a pollution tax would increase the environ-
mental quality even with respect to the ￿rst-best policy. On the other hand, this
condition never holds whenever m0 is su¢ ciently high (m0 >
￿￿(1￿￿)
￿(1+￿)+(￿+￿)￿).





(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
[￿ + (m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)]
2 + ￿ (m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
2
￿2 + (2 + (1 + ￿)￿)(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d)
> 0
Again, ndj￿d=0 = nss; so that
nd > nss > ncp 8￿d > 0
Hence this kind of abatement tax always increases the steady state number
of entries with respect to both the market and the ￿rst-best solution.
4.1.1 The e⁄ect on price, consumption and utility
The e⁄ect of this pollution tax on prices is ambiguous. Willingness to pay
depends positively on E and negatively on n: Since they both increase with ￿d;
willingness to pay will be higher or lower according to di⁄erent combinations
of the relevant parameters of the model. In the ￿rst case, it will be possible
to transfer part of the tax burden to the tourists. Although we have assumed
a perfectly elastic demand for tourist services, we can interpret this situation
as a sort of implicit tourist tax paid by tourists who, on the other hand, are
compensated with a better quality in their chosen destination. It is therefore
interesting to identify the conditions under which a pollution tax leads to an
increase in the willingness to pay. A ￿rst factor to consider is the value of the














@￿d are positive, a pollution tax will
always raise tourists WTP if they are "not-too-much" averse to crowding to
(i.e., when ￿ is very low). Contrariwise, if they are very crowding-averse, their
willingness to pay will be very sensitive to any increase in the number of tourists














￿ + [m0 + (1 ￿ m0)￿d]
so that per-capita environment is negatively in￿ uenced by the pollution tax
(that is, the percentage increment of tourist entries due to the pollution tax is
larger than the percentage increment of the environmental asset). As a conse-
quence, when ￿ is su¢ ciently high, for example when ￿ = ￿; WTP decreases




j￿=￿ = ￿￿(1 ￿ m0) < 0
and seeing that the price elasticity
@p(￿d)
@￿d =p(￿d) is monotonic in ￿; there is
a ￿
￿ 2 (0;￿) such that
@p(￿d)
@￿d j￿>￿￿ < 0
@p(￿d)
@￿d j￿<￿￿ > 0: The lower ￿;is the
closer ￿
￿ will be to zero. A policy implication of this argument would be that,
in order to transfer the tax burden towards foreign tourists, the host country
has to address to "not-so-much" crowding-averse tourists, that is, mass-tourism
(see ￿g. 4).
The behavior of consumption is more complex to be comprehend. It depends
on ￿d not only through the WTP but also positively through the e⁄ect on nd
and directly since the tax represents a means to force savings. Consumption




















This expression is clearly negative when ￿d is su¢ ciently large and will be
negative for every value of ￿d whenever ￿ is su¢ ciently high (elite tourism)
and m0; the natural regeneration rate, is very low (this is because the only
positive term
@n(￿d)
@￿d =n(￿d) tends to zero). In this case, a pollution tax would
always decrease consumption with respect to the market solution. However,
consumption elasticity with respect to the pollution tax rate can be positive for
17low values of ￿d; with consumption increasing in the tax rate, whenever ￿ and
m0 are su¢ ciently low. Because consumption is a positive function of both price
and n; it will certainly increases with ￿d if ￿ is close to zero, while its behavior
will be ambiguous whenever ￿ is su¢ ciently high.
Figure 5 clari￿es the relation between c and ￿d according to di⁄erent values
of ￿: For su¢ ciently high values of ￿; consumption always decreases with ￿d
whereas for su¢ ciently low values of ￿; a bell-shaped curve appears. Moreover,
the tax rate which maximizes consumption shifts to the right, and then increases
as ￿ decreases. That is, the less "snobbish" the kind of tourism supplied by the
country, the higher the tax rate which maximizes consumption will be.
Figure 6 describes the same relationship but takes into account di⁄erent
values of the natural rate of regeneration m0: As we can see, the introduction of
a pollution tax would always decrease consumption if the natural regeneration
rate is very high. This result is favoured by the fact that the larger m0; the
lower the productivity of the abatement technology. As m0 decreases, a bell-
shaped curve appears again and there is a positive tax rate ￿￿
d which maximizes
consumption. Moreover, and quite intuitively, ￿￿
d increases as m0 decreases.
As for utility, it depends positively not only on consumption, but also on
the stock of environmental asset E. The latter, as we have seen, is positively
in￿ uenced by ￿d so that, ceteris paribus, the pollution tax rate which maximizes
utility will be higher than the tax rate which maximizes consumption. Formally,
we ￿nd that, since steady state instantaneous utility is logarithmic, its derivative





















@￿ =Ed > 0 and since @Ud
@￿d is certainly negative for high values of ￿d; there
must be a ￿￿￿







= 0 and therefore U (￿￿￿
d ) is maximum.
Moreover, it must be ￿￿￿
d > ￿￿
d. Figures 7 and 8 describe these relations.
5 Abatement expenditures as a choice variable
In this section we introduce the possibility that residents invest in the pollution
abatement technology introduced before12. Individuals now have the possibility
to use part of their income to improve the environment and therefore tourism
revenues no longer coincide with consumption. In other words, we are allow-
ing for a sort of savings decision which was not possible in the previous case:
individuals save and invest their money in the environmental asset to increase
12Another possibility would be that of investing in a technology which reduces the marginal
impact of tourist entries on E: The analysis of this class of abatement expenditures, which
may have a growth-enhancing e⁄ect, are part of another research project
18their utility (E enters the utility function)13. Residents￿income has now to be
allocated between consumption and abatement expenditures
yt ￿ ntp(nt;Et) = ct + dt




ct = (1 ￿ zt)ntp(nt;Et)
5.1 The market solution
As in the previous section, we characterize the market solution as a situation
in which agents take WTP as given. Formally, a new control variable, zt; is





(lnct + ￿ lnEt)e￿￿tdt
s:t : _ Et = (m0 + (1 ￿ m0)z)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
: ct = (1 ￿ zt)ntp(nt;Et)
: (ct;nt;zt;Et) ￿ 0
The Hamiltonian, the ￿rst-order and the euler conditions are as follows
Ht = ln(1 ￿ zt)ntp(nt;Et) + ￿ lnEt + ￿
￿
(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt)




Hz = 0 : ￿
1
1 ￿ zt
+ ￿t (1 ￿ m0)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
= 0
Hn = 0 :
1
nt






+ m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt








￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿ (21)
Di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition on n, we ￿nd the optimal dynamics
for n which is given by
13They actually increase their utility indirectly through an increase in the tourists￿willing-
ness to pay too, but private agents do not perceive this and therefore they do not take it into






￿ ￿ + m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt
By using (21) we can eliminate one control variable and completely charac-









￿ ￿ P ￿ E
￿
!
￿ (1 + ￿) (22)
_ Et = ￿ P ￿ Et ￿ 2￿nt (23)
The two equilibrium manifolds are given by
_ n = 0 : nz
1 (E) =
(1 + ￿)E









_ E = 0 : nz
2 (E) =
￿ P ￿ E
2￿
5.1.1 Steady-state analysis
Unlike in the model without abatement expenditures, the _ n = 0 locus is now
a bell-shaped curve14. The _ E = 0 locus, by contrast, remains a decreasing
straight line but now its inclination is given by ￿ 1





1 (0) = nz
2 (0); the two curves intersect only once in the positive
orthant of the plane (E;n): The steady state with non-negative z;n and E is











1 + 2￿ + ￿
(25)





2(1￿m0) for m0 < 1
2







> 0 for E < Eggr









20So agents choose a positive saving only when m0; the natural regeneration
rate, is not too high. Roughly speaking, if the environment is in a good shape,
there is no need to spend money to safeguard it.
As for stability, we can state the following
Proposition 3 The equilibrium (E;n) = (Ez
ss;nz
ss) is locally a saddle point for
the system (22), (23).
Proof. In the appendix
5.1.2 Comparative statics
There is no particular change, with respect to the market solution without
abatement expenditures, in the way the steady state values of E and n depend
on the model￿ s parameters except that now the steady state values of both E and
n no longer depend on m0. As for z; we see that it only depends, negatively, on
m0: This is related to the fact that the marginal productivity of the abatement
technology with respect to z is simply (1 ￿ m0); so that an increase in m0








i⁄ m0 < (>)
1
2
However, since for m0 > 1
2 we ￿nd that zz
ss = 0; and since with zero abate-
ment expenditure Ez
ss = Ess and nz
ss = nss; the steady state values of E and n
are always higher in this case than in the case without abatement expenditures.
What happens to income? Even if the willingness to pay can be higher or
lower according to di⁄erent values of m0;￿ and ￿15; it is straightforward to
answer this question if we realize that income with abatement expenditures is






@m0 > 0 8m0; we see that, quite reasonably, income increases












so that per-capita environment decreases in the solution with defensive expenditures. An
intuition for this apparently counterintuitive results can be given by the fact that yet in the








: Since we also have pz
ss = pss when m0 = 1=2
willingness to pay is certainly lower in the technology abatement case when ￿ > ￿ ("snob
tourism"), and can be higher, for extreme values of m0; only when ￿ >> ￿:






























So it might be greater than css whenever z is not too big (i.e. m0 is su¢ -
ciently high) and ￿ is not too large (￿g. 9).
As for steady state utility, as long as agents assign a positive value to z;
utility increases by de￿nition.
5.2 The central planner solution
As in the previous case, the central planner will now take into account the fact
that agents￿decisions in￿ uence tourists￿willingness to pay. The hamiltonian,
the ￿rst-order and euler equation of the optimization problem are as follows
H = ln(1 ￿ zt)n
1￿￿
t ￿ + (￿ + ￿)lnE + ￿t
￿
(m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt)




Hz = 0 : ￿t =
1
(1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ m0)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿








+ m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt
From the ￿rst-order conditions we obtain z as a function of E and n:
zt =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ m0)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ m0)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿ (26)






￿ ￿ + m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt (27)
Substituting for z in (27) and in the motion equation, we obtain the dynamic











￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿ ￿ (1 + ￿) (28)
_ Et =








22where we notice that, unlike in the case without technology abatement, the
central planner decision changes the dynamics of E. This is because of the
presence of z whose steady state value is di⁄erent according to whether it is
decided by the market or by the central planner. Notice, however, that the
di⁄erence between the two choices is determined exclusively by ￿ (the externality
on n) and not by ￿ (the externality related to E). In other words, as ￿ tends to
zero, the central planner solution on z tends to the market solution and therefore
the two dynamics of E turn out to be the same even if ￿ > 0:
5.2.1 Steady state analysis
The two equilibrium manifolds (￿g. 10) are given by














_ E = 0 : n
cp
2 (E) =




The equilibrium with non-negative z;n and E exists and is unique for the
same reason stated in the market case and is given by.
Ez
cp =
￿ P (￿ + ￿)








1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)
1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿(1 + ￿) + ￿ + ￿
As for stability, we can state the following






is locally a saddle point for
the system (28), (29).
Proof. In the appendix







So that the willingness to pay is surely higher in the centralized solution.
By contrast can see that








(2￿￿)(1￿m0) for m0 < 1￿￿
2￿￿






which may seem counterintuitive at ￿rst sight. The explanation for this is
that the decision about z involves only the marginal value of n (which is lower
in the central planner solution) and not the marginal value of E (which is higher
in the central planner solution). Since the shadow price of z must be equal to
the marginal value of n and the shadow price of z (which is equal in both the
solutions) is an increasing function of z; the central planner solution requires
a lower level of z: One result connected to this issue is that the value of the
natural regeneration capacity m0 such that the central planner will decide to
invest a positive level of resources in the PAT is lower than the market case.
Fig. 11 describes the behavior of consumption, income and abatement ex-
penditures considered as functions of crowding aversion ￿: As we can see16, while
abatement expenditures are always lower in the centralized solution, there is a
￿ = ￿
￿ such that income in the centralized solution becomes higher than in the
market solution. For an even lower ￿
￿￿ < ￿
￿, consumption also becomes higher
in the centralized solution. In this case, the ￿
￿￿ which reverses the ordering
relation is lower because centralized consumption is positively in￿ uenced by ￿
since a higher ￿ means a lower fraction devoted to abatement expenditures. By
contrast, market consumption is in￿ uenced by ￿ only through the willingness to
pay.
But the ordering relation between consumption and income in the centralized
and market solution changes, as in the case without abatement expenditures,
even with respect to residents￿love for the environment ￿. As ￿g. 12 shows, if ￿
is not too high, consumption and income are both larger in the central planner
solution.
5.3 The e⁄ect of a corrective tax on income
Introducing the level of abatement expenditures as a choice variable opens the
door to a variety of tax policies. In this section we focus speci￿cally on a
corrective tax analogous to the one applied to the case where there was no
abatement expenditures. In this case, a corrective tax scheme was successful,
i.e., it was capable of directing the economy along the ￿rst-best dynamic path.
We will show that this is no longer true when we introduce the option of saving:
a corrective tax may increase steady state utility with respect to the market
solution, but utility never reaches the centralized level. The di⁄erence stems
from the fact that now, since a new choice variable (z) has been introduced,
one policy instrument alone is not su¢ cient to ensure reaching the ￿rst-best
solution.
We then assume that a tax ￿z is imposed by the government on tourist rev-
enues. Tax revenues are then redistributed to agents with lump-sum transfers.
The government budget constraint is given by
￿zntp(nt;Et) = vt (31)
16This can be shown mathematically. Proofs are available at request
24where vt are the lump-sum transfers. Individuals￿budget constraint is then
given by
(1 ￿ ￿z)ntp(nt;Et) + vt = ct + dt
Considering that abatement expenditures are a fraction z of the income, we
obtain the following:
ct = (1 ￿ zt)(1 ￿ ￿z)ntp(nt;Et) + (1 ￿ z)vt




(ln((1 ￿ zt)(1 ￿ ￿z)ntp(nt;Et) + (1 ￿ zt)vt) + ￿ lnEt)e￿tdt
s:t: : _ Et = (m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt)




First-order and euler conditions are given by
Hn = 0 : ￿t =
(1 ￿ ￿z)ntp(Et;nt) + vt
[(1 ￿ ￿z)(1 ￿ zt)ntp(Et;nt) + vt (1 ￿ zt)](1 ￿ m0)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
Hz = 0 : ￿t =
1
￿
(1 ￿ ￿z)(1 ￿ zt)p(Et;nt)






+ m0 + (1 ￿ m0)zt
Tax revenues are redistributed once agents￿decisions are made. Substituting
for vt using (31) and equating the two ￿rst-order condition we ￿nd z as a function
of n and E
(1 ￿ ￿z)(1 ￿ m0)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
(1 ￿ ￿z)(1 ￿ m0)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿ = zt (32)
where we notice that for ￿z = ￿ the tax solution for z equates to the ￿rst-best
solution.
Di⁄erentiating the ￿rst-order condition on n, equating it to the euler equa-
tion and eliminating the z variable, we can characterize the steady state property












￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
!
￿ (￿ + 1)
_ Et =






The two equilibrium manifolds are given by




￿ ￿ P ￿ E
￿








_ E = 0 : n
￿z
2 (E) =





25It￿ s easy to note that the corrective tax which "optimizes" the _ E = 0 manifold,
￿z = ￿; does not coincide with the one that "optimizes" the _ n = 0 manifold17.
A unique and saddle point equilibrium with non-negative z;n and E exists18











1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿z (1 + ￿)
1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿z (1 + ￿) + ￿
z￿z
ss =
(2 ￿ ￿z)(1 ￿ m0) ￿ 1
(2 ￿ ￿z)(1 ￿ m0)
Quite intuitively, the tax works in the right direction since it increases the
environmental stock (E￿z
ss > Ez
ss), it decreases tourist ￿ ows (n￿z
ss < nz
ss) and it
decreases the saving propensity (z￿z
ss < zz
ss): However, this is not su¢ cient to
reach the ￿rst-best solution. This is clear if we observe that z￿z
ss = zcp only







and too low to reduce tourist ￿ ows to any su¢ cient
degree (n￿z
ss > ncp): Since with every other tax z￿z
ss 6= zz
cp; and since the optimal
solution is unique, a corrective tax-scheme with abatement expenditures can
only reach a second-best solution.
Moreover, since @E
@￿ > 0 and @n
@￿ < 0; this kind of tax always will increase
tourists￿willingness to pay. So that part of the tax burden can be transferred
to tourists, making them pay an implicit tourist tax and rewarding them with
a higher quality of the tourist services supplied.
On the other hand, since n￿z
ss is decreasing with ￿z; income (net of tax and
transfers) may decrease after the introduction of the corrective tax. A corrective
tax will increase income only if ￿ is su¢ ciently high so that the negative e⁄ect
on the number of tourists is more than compensated for by the higher WTP
(￿g. 13)
Consumption behavior with respect to ￿z di⁄ers from income because the
former is also in￿ uenced by the tax rate by means of (1 ￿ zz
ss); which depends
positively on ￿z: For this reason, it is more likely that consumption will be pos-
itively in￿ uenced by the tax, unless the tax is not excessively high. In other
words, the set of parameters for which a bell-shaped relation between consump-
tion and tax rate emerges is larger with respect to the relationship between
income and tax rate. The tax rate which maximizes consumption is a function








￿ ￿ P ￿ E
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18Proof is analogous with the previous case
26of all the model￿ s parameters. Among them, we focus on the role of ￿ and ￿:
Figure 14 shows how the optimal tax rate with respect to consumption becomes
higher as ￿ increases.
Fig. 15 shows the same relationship for di⁄erent values of the parameter ￿:
In this case as well, the tax which maximizes consumption is increasing in ￿:
This is not surprising, since the higher ￿ and ￿ are, the greater the e⁄ect of the
externalities needed to be corrected by the tax will be.
But the most important relationship is clearly the one between the tax rate
and utility, since a benevolent central planner would choose the corrective tax
rate which maximizes steady state utility. The way utility is in￿ uenced by the
tax rate di⁄ers from consumption because environmental assets directly enter
the utility function. This di⁄erence is clearly all the more relevant as ￿ increases.
Since E￿z














the tax rate which maximizes utility will be higher than the tax rate which
maximizes consumption. The larger the ￿; the larger the weight of E in the
utility function and, therefore, the higher the di⁄erence between the tax rate
which maximizes utility and the one which maximizes consumption. Except
for this feature, the qualitative behavior of the relationship will be similar: the
higher ￿ and ￿ are, the higher the tax rate which maximizes consumption will
be. By contrast, the higher ￿; the lower the tax rate which maximizes utility:
the more people love the environment, the less need there will be to impose a
tax to defend it.
5.4 The ine⁄ectiveness of a pollution tax
In this section we show that a policy scheme which taxes income to ￿nance
abatement expenditures will not manage to shift the economy from the market
dynamic path. The government imposes a tax ￿p on income and employs the tax
gains gt in pollution abatement technology. The government￿ s budget constraint
is then
gt = ￿pyt
The individuals￿budget constraint is
(1 ￿ ￿p)yt = ct + da
t
Where da
t = (1 ￿ ￿p)ztyt represents "private" abatement expenditures. To-
tal abatement expenditures is the sum of the resources employed by private
agents and by the government
dt = da
t + gt = (1 ￿ ￿p)ztyt + ￿pyt
so that the motion equation becomes
_ Et = (m0 + (1 ￿ m0)(￿p + zp (1 ￿ ￿p)))
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
27First-order and euler conditions for this problem are given by
Hz = 0 : ￿t =
1
(1 ￿ zt)(1 ￿ m0)(1 ￿ ￿p)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿








+ m0 + ￿z (1 ￿ m0) + zt (1 ￿ m0)(1 ￿ ￿p)
According to these conditions, the optimal value of z; as a function of n and
E; is
(1 ￿ m0)(1 ￿ ￿d)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
￿ ￿nt
(1 ￿ m0)(1 ￿ ￿d)
￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿ = zt (33)
Di⁄erentiating the FOC on n, equating to the euler equation and substituting









￿ ￿ P ￿ Et
￿
!
￿ (1 + ￿) (34)
_ Et = ￿ P ￿ Et ￿ 2￿nt (35)
which is identical to the dynamic path resulting from the market solution
without tax. The motivation for these results depends on the particular util-
ity function chosen and lies in the fact that once a tax is imposed on agents,
they readapt their optimal choice on z in such a way that the total amount of
abatement expenditures remain unchanged.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the dynamic evolution of a small open economy specialized
in tourism based on natural resources when tourism services are supplied to
foreign tourists who are averse to crowding adverse and who are willing to pay
for environmental quality. We have analysed the steady-state properties and
ran several policy exercises in two versions of the model: in the ￿rst, private
agents￿income is entirely spent on consumption while, in the second, agents are
allowed to invest part of their income in pollution abatement technology (PAT)
which arti￿cially increases the regeneration rate of the environmental asset. A
unique locally saddle point equilibrium has been found in both versions and
for both the market and the central planner solutions. We also found that:
1) a corrective tax on income raises steady state utility in both versions but is
capable of directing the economy in its ￿rst-best dynamic path only when agents
cannot invest in the PAT; 2) when PAT is available to the government but not
to agents, an income tax which ￿nances abatement expenditures may increase
steady state utility with respect to the market solution when both the natural
28regeneration rate of the environment and the degree of crowding aversion are
low enough; 3) when PAT is available, the market chooses to devote a fraction
of income to abatement higher than the optimal solution but which is positive
only when the natural rate of regeneration is not too large; 4) when PAT is
avalilable an income pollution tax totally ine⁄ective.
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A Proof of proposition 1




























So the unique steady state is locally a saddle￿:
B Proof of proposition 2



















detJcp = ￿(￿ + m0)
￿
m0 +
(￿ + m0)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(￿ + ￿)
￿
which is clearly negative. So the unique steady state is locally a saddle.
C Proof of proposition 3



































ss) is locally a saddle point￿
D Proof of proposition 4





















































is locally a saddle point￿
E Figures





Fig. 1: optimal (thick) and decentralized (thin) consumption as functions of ￿:












Figure 1: Fig. 2: the _ E = 0 and _ n = 0 manifolds in the central planner solution
(thick), in the market solution (thin) and in the corrective tax solution (dots).
The _ E = 0 manifolds is the same in the central planner and market solution.





Fig.3: the relation between m0 and E in the optimal (thick) and pollution tax
solution (dots). The latter is drawn for di⁄erent values of ￿d:(0:1;0:2;0:3 and
0:5): For very low values of m0; a positive ￿d would always increase the
enviromental stock of resources.





Fig. 4: the relationship between the pollution tax rate and willingness to pay
according to di⁄erent values of ￿: The reference values for ￿ is 0:25 (thick).
The relationship is drawn for ￿ < 0:25 (dots) and for ￿ > 0:25 (dash). For very
low values of ￿ (in red) this relationship becomes positive: an increase in ￿d
will increase the tourists willingness to pay.





Fig. 5: the relationship between the pollution tax rate and consumption
di⁄erent values of ￿: The curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:25 (thick) and for values
of ￿ smaller (dots) or larger (boxes) than 0:25. For very high values of ￿ this
relationship is negative, so that a tax would always decrease consumption. For
lower values of ￿ a bell-shaped curve appears.





Fig. 6: the relationship between the pollution tax rate and consumption
di⁄erent values of m0: The curves are drawn for m0 = 0:2 (thick) and for
values of m0 smaller (dots) or larger (boxes) than 0:2. For very high values of
m0 this relationship is negative, so that a tax would always decrease
consumption. For lower values of m0 a bell-shaped curve appears.






Fig 7: the relationship between Utility and the pollution tax rate according to
di⁄erent values of ￿: The curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:25 (thick) and for values
of ￿ smaller (dots) or larger (boxes) than 0:25. As ￿ decreases, a bell shaped
relationship appears






Fig. 8: the relationship between Utility and the pollution tax rate according
to di⁄erent values of m0: The curves are drawn for m0 = 0:2 (thick) and for
values of m0 smaller (dots) or larger (boxes) than 0:2. As m0 decreases, a bell
shaped relationship appears





Fig. 9: the relationship between consumption and m0 with (thick) and










Figure 2: Fig. 10: the _ E = 0 and the _ n = 0 manifolds in the market (thick)
and central planner solution (dots) with abatement expenditures





Fig. 11: Income, consumption and abatement expenditures as functions of ￿ in
both the market (thick) and central planner solution (dots). While def.
expenditures are always lower in the cp solution, when ￿ is large enough
consumption is higher in the centralized solution. For an even larger ￿; also
income may be higher in the centralized solution





Fig 12: Income, consumption and defensive expenditures as function of ￿ in
the optimal (dots) and decentralized (thick) solution. For low values of ￿;
consumption and income are higher in the central planner solution.





Fig 13: the relationship between income and the corrective tax rate according
to di⁄erent value of ￿: Curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:25 (thick), for values of
￿ > 0:25 (boxes) and for values of ￿ < 0:25 (dots). When ￿ is large enough, a
corrective tax always increases tourism revenues.





Fig. 14: the relationship between consumption and the corrective tax rate
according to di⁄erent value of ￿: The curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:25 (thick), for
values of ￿ > 0:25 (boxes) and for values of ￿ < 0:25 (dots). The higher ￿; the
higher the tax rate which maximize consumption.





Fig. 15: the relationship between consumption and the corrective tax rate
according to di⁄erent value of ￿: The curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:35 (thick), for
values of ￿ > 0:35 (boxes) and for values of ￿ < 0:35 (dots). The higher ￿; the
higher the tax rate which maximize consumption.






Fig. 16: the relationship between untility and the corrective tax rate according
to di⁄erent value of ￿: The curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:25 (thick), for values of
￿ > 0:25 (boxes) and for values of ￿ < 0:25 (dots). The higher ￿; the higher the
tax rate which maximize utility.






Fig. 17: the relationship between untility and the corrective tax rate according
to di⁄erent value of ￿: The curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:35 (thick), for values of
￿ > 0:35 (boxes) and for values of ￿ < 0:35 (dots). The higher ￿; the higher
the tax rate which maximize utility.






Fig. 18: the relationship between utility and the corrective tax rate according
to di⁄erent value of ￿: The curves are drawn for ￿ = 0:4 (thick), for values of
￿ > 0:4 (boxes) and for values of ￿ < 0:4 (dots). The higher ￿; the lower the
tax rate which maximize utility.
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